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IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN*

The Limits Imposed by International
Law on the Application of Cartel Lawt
That the application of cartel law, and in particular of penal provisions
enacted thereunder, is subject to certain limits in international law beyond
which the cartel legislation of individual States may not go, is widely
acknowledged.' Not so the precise location of the extreme limits permissible for the sphere of validity defined by these provisions themselves
(jurisdiction to prescribe);2 just how controversial this is can be illustrated
by the fact that the paper presented by Ian Hunter at the meeting of the
International Law Association in The Hague in August 1970 offered a
choice between no fewer than three alternatives, 3 namely:
(1) International law, as evidenced by the general practice of states to date,
does not permit a state to assume or exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over
the conduct of an alien which occurs within the territory of another state or
states solely on the basis that such conduct produces "effects" or repercussions within its territory.
(2) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct that
occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory if:
(a) the conduct
and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
4
the rule applies;
(b) the effect within the territory is substantial; and
(c) it occurs as a direct and primarily intended result of the conduct outside
the territory.
(3) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct
occurring wholly outside its territory if such conduct produces effects within
the territory which the state reprehends.
*Associate Member of the Institute of International Law.
tPaper read in Cologne on 23rd October, 1971, at the Seminar on U.S. Antitrust Law
and European Enterprises, held under the auspices of the Forschungsinstitut flr Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettbewerb e. V., Cologne, The Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht, e. V.,
Dusseldorf, and the Practising Law Institute, New York.
1
Oehler, Theorie des Strafanwendungsrechts, in Aktuelle Probleme des Internationalen
Strafrechts (Heinrich Griitzner-Festschrift 1970), p. 110. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Volkerrecht,
(1969)
pp. 214-215.
2
As opposed to the actual sphere of operation in which these measures are also enforceable (jurisdiction to enforce). On the delimitation of jurisdiction to enforce from jurisdiction to
prescribe, see American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND), FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965) s.7, pp. 21-22.
3

4

1d., pp. 59-60.

0n the interpretation of this polysemantic expression, see Hermanns, Voilkerrechtliche
Grenzen for die Anwendung kartellrechtlicher Verbotsnormen (1969), pp. 60- 6 1.
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Alternative 3 corresponds in effect to the Alcoa judgment. 5 This judgment sought in principle to penalize only such acts originating abroad as
were performed with the intention of producing an effect in the state of the
forum. But from the fact that there was an effect in the state of the forum,
the judgment concluded that there must have been an intention on the part
of the offender to produce that effect. 6 Section 98(2) of the German Law
against Restraint of Competition and-following its example 7-Art. 85 of
the E.E.C. Treaty, base the claim to penal jurisdiction simply on the fact of
an effect being produced in the state of the forum. Even in their formulation, therefore, they conform to the model of Alternative 3.
The Alcoa decision had also served as a model for sec. 8 of Tentative
Draft No. 2 (1958) of the Restatement of the Law (Second), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, published by the American Law
Institute. Criticisms were levelled against this formulation, particularly by
a European Advisory Committee under Lord McNair to which the author
had the honour to belong. The views of this Advisory Committee are
reproduced by Hunter in his Alternative 1. Criticism of this alternative-as
expressed also in The Hague-overlooks the importance of the restriction
residing in the word 'solely.' In the classic example of the shot over the
frontier, for instance, the State in which the victim was would still be able
to claim penal jurisdiction under Alternative 1, since more than mere
effects or repercussions would be involved.
Alternative 2 leans heavily on sec. 18 of the final version of the Restatement. The wording chosen in that section was an attempt by the American
Law Institute to come some way toward meeting the objections of the
European Advisory Committee." In his Alternative 2, Hunter has defined
the underlying restriction of the Alcoa rule more closely.
5

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1954),
Whiteman,
Digest of International Law 6, p. 140.
6
Hermanns, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
7
Graupner, The Law Relating to Restrictive Trade Practices in West Germany and in the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, in Comparative Aspects of Restrictive Trade Practices, International and Comparative Law quarterly, Supplementary Publication No. 2 (1961), p. 53. On the territorial sphere of operation of Article 85 E.E.C., see also
Cerexhe in Ganshof van der Meersch (editor), DROIT DES COMMUNAUTgS EUROP9ENNES
(1969), p. 817, No. 2021. Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the E.E.C. Treaty,
FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, pp. 247- 277, and Van Damme, La Mise en Oeuvre des Articles 85
et 86 du Traite de Rome, CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN, 1966, pp. 304-305. S.98(2) of the
German Law against Restraint of Competition was in turn influenced by the Alcoa decision.
Rehbinder, Extraterritoriale Wirkungen des deutschen Kartellrechts, p. 49 (1965).

OThese criticisms were also directed against sec. 8 of Tentative Draft No. 2 (1958) of the
Restatement referred to in note 2; this Draft followed the Alcoa decision. The change in
attitude of the American Law Institute is attributable to the criticisms of the European
Advisory Committee under Lord McNair (Hermanns, op. cit., p. 70). Against this "watering-down" of Tentative Draft No. 2, see Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States: Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 41 New York University Law
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2

Limits Imposed on Cartel Law
There is no way of avoiding a decision, at least 9 between Alternatives 2
and 3. It cannot be maintained that cartel law, as a form of administrative
penal law, is subject to looser rules of delimitation than penal law sensu
stricto. 10 Nor can every claim to the extraterritorial validity of cartel law
be dismissed simply on the ground that it constitutes public law, which
cannot in principle be enforced outside the frontiers of the state concerned."
It would be incorrect, however, to deduce that Alternative 3 represents
the position in international law merely from the fact that both sec. 98(2) of
the German Law against Restraint of Competition and Art. 85 of the
E.E.C. Treaty-and as the latest, rather unexpected link in this chain sec.
7(2)(b) of the Swiss Cartel Law of 20th December, 1962, at least according
to an obiter dictum of the Swiss Federal Court-are geared to the mere
12
effect in the national territory.
In the Mariposa case it was rightly decided that the mere promulgation
of an enactment which is potentially at variance with international law does
not in itself constitute an infringement of international law. An injustice in
international law does not occur until rights protected by international law
are impaired by the concrete application of such an enactment.' 3 But as
Review (1966), pp. 15- 17. The American Law Institute rightly declined, however, to consider
further limitations not recommended by this Advisory Committee. It had been proposed that a
criminal prosecution should only be admissible if the offense was punishable in both countries.
Krumbein, Die extraterritoriale Wirkung des Antitrustrechts (diss. Cologne 1967), cites in this
connection Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Antitrust
Laws and Foreign Trade (1957), p. 9. This proposal would lead to the coming into being of
cartel support countries, similar to the tax havens.
9
Alternative 2 could under certain circumstances be interpreted as an elucidation of the
term "solely" in Alternative I.
I 0Schlochauer, Die extraterritoriale Wirkung von Hoheitsakten (1962), p. 54 ff., Rehbinder, op. cit., p. 87; contra, Seidl-Hohenveldern, review of Schlochauer's book in JZ 1963, 39;
simile, Van Hecke, Le Droit Anti-Trust, Aspects Comparatifs et internktionaux, Recueil des
Cours 106 (1962, 11), p. 303, and Schwartz, Deutsches Internationales Kartellrecht (1962), p.
268.
" Seidl-Hohenveldern, AWD 1960, p. 277 bottom left; Hug, Die Anwendbarkeit der
kartellrechtlichen Bestimmungen iber die EWG auf in Nichtmitgliedstaaten veranlasste Beschrinkungen im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Kartelle und Monopole im modernen Recht (1961),
p. 635; contra, Bar, Kartellrecht und Internationales Privatrecht (1965), p. 297, and my
elucidation in my review of Bar in American Journal of Comparative Law (1969), 16, p. 276;
against the principle referred to, see in particular P.A. Lalive, Droit Public Etranger et Ordre
Public Suisse, Eranion in honorem G.S. Maridakis (1964) Vol. III, p. 191 ff.
2
1 1n its decision in Librairie Hachette S.A. et Consorts v. Soci6t6 Coop6rative d'Achat et
de Distribution des N6gociants en Tabacs et Journaux et Consorts, BGE 93 II 192, 196,
WuW 1970, pp. 355-356, the Swiss Federal Court also interpreted sec. 7(2)(b) of the Swiss
Cartel Law of 20th December, 1962-admittedly in an obiter dictum-as meaning that that
Law must be applied to all cartels producing in Switzerland effects which are prohibited in
that country. This is contested by Frank Vischer, Bundesgerichtspraxis zum Internationalen
Obligationenrecht 1966- 1967, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch ftir Internationales Recht XXV
(1968), pp. 326-327.
13
U.S.-Panama Claims Commission, Mariposa Claim, Ann. Dig. 1933-34, No. 99. SimInternational Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2

282

INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

Hermanns pointed out in The Hague, sec. 98(2) of the aforementioned
German Law has never yet been applied to a case in which the facts fitted
Alternative 3. The question is therefore still open.
On Art. 85 of the E.E.C. Treaty, Thiesing l4 likewise pointed out in The
Hague that in both the Dyestuffs 15 and the Quinine 16 cases, part of the
activity complained of had taken place within the territory of the E.E.C.
Nevertheless, the Commission of the European Communities has stressed
that its claim to penal jurisdiction extends to acts performed by foreign
firms outside the Common Market which have effects within the Common
17
Market.
The vacillation of these statements shows how difficult it is in practice to
draw the line here. What is "mere effect"; what, indeed, is "part of an
activity" or "constituent elements"? Precisely in cartel cases, the presence

and extent of an effect from outside is certainly more difficult to establish
than in the case of the shot fired over the frontier.1 8 Nevertheless, I
consider it to be unduly pessimistic to doubt the possibility of effecting
such demarcations at all(-and then to derive from that an argument in
support of Alternative 3).
It should not be beyond the wit of lawyers to draw distinctions here.
One such attempt is the Aide-M6moire of October 1969, in which the

British Government protested against the Dyestuffs decision of the Commission of the European Communities.' 9 Nevertheless, it was pointed out
during the debate in the Hague that some of the formulations in this
Aide-M6moire, too, are capable of more than one interpretation. Hunter's
initiative in the Hague was all the more welcome, therefore; by means of a
ilarly Hermanns, op. cit., p. 8. Reservedly, PCIJ Series A No. 7 (Chorz6w case), p. 46; cf.
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Volkerrecht (1969), p.273, Rz. 1214.
14
J.J.A. Ellis, Extra-territorial Application of Anti-Trust Legislation, XVII Ned.
Tijdschr. v. Int. Recht p. 67 (1970) refers to a lecture delivered in October 1969 before the
Federation of Netherlands Industry by the member of the Commission primarily responsible
for questions of competition.
' 5Official Journal of the European Communities 1969, L 195, p. 1I.
16
Complaint against the decision of the Commission of the European Communities of
16.7.69, Official Journal of the European Communities L 192, p. 5. The decision by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, by which the penalties imposed by the Commission
were reduced (Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung of July 17, 1970), came too late for comment
here. 7
1 This pronouncement concerned the Dyestuffs case. Third Comprehensive Report on
the Activities of the Communities 1969, para. 34; the Commission thus confirmed the forecast
of its future conduct given by Focsaneanu in an opinion quoted by Blair, The Quinine
Convention of 1959-1962: A Case Study of an International Cartel, in H. ARNDT, RECHT,
MACHT UND WIRTSCHAFT (1968), pp. 173- 174.
8

' Van Hecke, op. cit., p. 311; Haight, InternationalLaw and ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. (1953/54), p. 648 ff.; Ellis, Comment, I II U. PENN. L.
REV. (1963), p. 1129 ff. Further evidence in Krumbein, op. cit., p. 114, note 2; as in the text,
Krumbein, op. cit., p. 118.
19 British Practice of International Law 1967 quoted by Ellis (supra note 14) p. 65-67.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
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questionnaire, he invited all interested circles to say how they would solve
the cases described therein in the light of the principles for which they
stood. Two of these test cases will now be discussed briefly.
Hunter's Case No. 3 concerns two companies, A and B, domiciled and
having their real centres of management in Britain. They conclude an
agreement in London to divide up the E.E.C. market between them. Company A is to supply solely in the Federal Republic of Germany, while
company B is to confine itself to France. Can criminal proceedings be
brought against company A in France on account of "refus de vente"?
Such an agreement would certainly have effects on the E.E.C. market. A
radical supporter of Alternative 3 would therefore have to answer the
question in the affirmative. Indeed, he would even have to advocate penalizing both firms a second time on the same set of facts for infringing Art. 85
20
of the E.E.C. Treaty.
To punish a mere omission abroad, which is what the "refus de vente"
amounts to, seems however, to be going too far, and is certainly not
defensible from the point of view of Alternatives 2 and 1. One is tempted
here to vary slightly Madame Dubarry's outburst: "0 Freedom (of competition), what constraints are committed in thy name!" At the time of the
struggle for the Sherman Act it was common practice in the United States
to describe the founders of the large trusts as "robber barons." Opponents
of cartels who would regard criminal proceedings as admissible in the
present case ought therefore to feel like super-robber barons. The robber
barons of the Middle Ages used, it is true, to stretch a chain across a river
with the object of mulcting merchants as they came sailing downstream.
But they did not first ride across country to compel the merchants to use
the river.
It is not easy to think out examples of circumstances under which
comparable claims to extraterritorial penal jurisdiction on account of a
mere omission would even have been entertained. The classic example of
the shot fired across the frontier fails us completely here, since the marksman undoubtedly performs an act. A person standing on the far bank of a
frontier river who sees someone fall into the water from the other bank
without coming to his aid is admittedly punishable for withholding assistance; but such conduct would constitute an offence on either side of the
frontier river. Such a case would not in practice be likely to raise any
problems. 21 Under many legal systems, high treason against foreign states
does not carry any penalty. For its part, however, the foreign state concerned will in many cases threaten to penalize anyone who fails to give
20
Vide
21

infra, text at nn. 37 and 38.
Vide supra, n. 8.
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information of a treasonable act which has come to his knowledge. Could
therefore a state threaten to penalize a national of another state who,
standing on his own side of the frontier river, saw terrorists ferrying
explosives over the river and failed to report this to the foreign authorities?
One should regard such a claim to penal jurisdiction as inadmissible,
although it could be supported by the protective principle.
However, according to the prevailing doctrine, a claim to penal jurisdiction in cartel matters should be based, not on the protective principle, but
solely on the extended territoriality principle. 22 The protective principle is
therefore of interest in this discussion only inasmuch as its very existence
precludes the possibility of regarding every effect from abroad on the
national territory as sufficient to localize the act partly within that territory
and then proceeding to construct from this a claim to penal jurisdiction
based on the extended territoriality principle. 23 Assertions of jurisdiction
on account of treasonable acts committee abroad are the classic examples
of claims to penal jurisdiction based on the protective principle. But these
acts, too, are surely intended to have effects on the national territory. Why
then does the prevailing doctrine bring the protective principle into the
picture at all in these cases, if the claim to penal jurisdiction could after all
be based on Alternative 3 of the extended territoriality principle?
In order to construct an example of a claim based on the extended
territoriality principle to penalize an omission committed abroad, one must
return to the Quaker States of the 18th century, where adultery was a
felony, and failure to report a felony which had come to one's knowledge
was at least a misdemeanour. Would such a state really have been entitled
to penalize an alien who, from the territory of a neighbouring state which
took a liberal view of such matters, saw a young man paying secret visits to
the young wife of the old Quaker mayor, if that alien had failed to draw the
attention of the authorities of the Quaker State to these suspicious visits?
Then as now, the answer can surely only be a plain no; but Alternative 3
would allow penal jurisdiction in a case of "refus de vente", i.e. on account
of a mere omission in another country where it does not constitute an
offence.
Hunter's example No. 2 concerns two European producers who agree
not to charge more than a certain price for their products in South America
or to sell them there on particular terms, in order, for instance, to squeeze a
2
Hermanns, op. cit., p. 37; contra, Rehbinder, op. cit., p. 8 1. United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), AM. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1968) p. 975, draws a clear dividing-line
between the extended territoriality principle applicable in cartel cases and the protective
principle, on which the claim to penal jurisdiction was based in this case of perjury in a visa
application to the U.S. Consulate in Montreal.
2Krumbein, op. cit., p. 143.
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competitor out of that market. In practice, their conduct in that market
amounts to dumping. Their agreement does not extend to North America,
but as a result of their conduct prices rise in the U.S.A. Does the U.S.A.
have jurisdiction to penalize the two producers? Not according to Alternatives 2 and 1, since there was no intention here to affect the U.S. market.
On page 60 of his paper, Hunter mentions a further hypothetical case in
which the I.L.A. Anti-Trust Committee was unwilling to allow a claim to
penal jurisdiction based on mere effects. A Netherlands law prohibits the
erection of tall buildings within a certain radius of an airport. If now an
airport were to be built on Netherlands territory so close to the Belgian
frontier that the prohibited zone extends into Belgian territory, it would not
be possible for the Netherlands courts to punish a Belgian for erecting a
building on Belgian soil but within the prohibited zone.
Yet here, too, under Alternative 3 the Netherlands would be able to
claim jurisdiction, since the conduct of the Belgian in Belgium undoubtedly
runs counter to the protective intent of the Netherlands law and therefore
constitutes conduct that the Netherlands reprehends.
If one were really to recognize a claim to penal jurisdiction in such a
case, one would have to be consistent and, where the position is reversed,
allow aliens abroad the possibility of invoking the protection of a domestic
law even in cases in which conduct in the national territory also produces
effects abroad, or indeed produces only effects abroad. Now the Austrian
Administrative Court recently had to deal with a case which was virtually
the mirror image of the Belgian-Netherlands airport case thought up by
Hunter. An Austrian law allows the municipalities and owners of properties in the neighbourhood of an airfield the right to a hearing when extension of the airfield is contemplated. In connection with the extension of an
Austrian airfield at Salzburg which directly adjoined the frontier with
Bavaria, Austrian municipalities and residents of Austria were allowed to
take part in such a hearing in order to protest against the increased noise,
but the Bavarian municipality of Frielassing which adjoined the airfield, or
Austrian nationals resident in Freilassing were not. It was held that the
relevant provisions of the administrative law were in principle territorial in
character. When therefore they accorded rights "to municipalities," this
24
was to be understood as referring exclusively to Austrian municipalities.
With similar narrowmindedness, an American court allowed the export
of contaminated foodstuffs to Austria, 25 while the Austrian Administrative
"Austrian Administrative Court 3.6.69, ZI. 233/69/3 and 314/69/2. The decision is being
published in International Law Reports.
2eUnited States v. Catz American Co., 53 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1931); SeidlHohenveldern, American-Austrian Private International Law (1963), p. 34.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
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Court refrained from punishing an Austrian who had labelled water from a
particular spring as "medicinal water," although under Austrian law it was
not entitled to be so described. The accused had in fact been able to show
that all the misleadingly labelled water was exported to the Federal Repub26
lic of Germany.
This nationalistic illogicality is particularly marked in the field of cartel
law. The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
E.E.C.-to name but three examples-are on the one hand concerned to
penalize mere effects of foreign trade on their internal competition, while
on the other hand they exclude export cartels from the ban on cartels in

domestic law, since export cartels only have the effect of restraining competition abroad. 27 Dr. E. Giinther, the President of the German "Bundeskartellamt," rightly pointed out at the Frankfurt Conference on Cartel

Law in 196028 that this attitude was illogical; it reminded him of the old
countryman's prayer to the patron saint of firefighters: "Dear St. Florian,
protect my house and set others alight instead."
The national egoism in cartel matters is reminiscent of certain features of
the situation prevailing in the field of exchange control prior to the creation
of the International Monetary Fund. There too, States were at pains to
protect their own markets by means of stringent currency laws, while at the
same time declaring similar foreign enactments, which had the effect of
aggravating their own currency situation, to be incompatible with their own
29
ordre public.
The alternatives hitherto discussed for limiting the extraterritorial penal
jurisdiction claimed by individual national cartel laws have not so far

provided any unambiguous and universally acceptable (let alone universally accepted) solution to the problem which arises when a State claims

such jurisdiction over conduct on the territory of another State where such
26Austrian Administrative Court 9.5.67, Osterr. Jur. Z. 1968, p. 305.
The Webb-Pomerene Act (U.S.A.) and sec. 6(1) of the German Law against Restraint
of Competition; cf. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 47 ff. A cartel agreement to share the Austrian
market, concluded in the Federal Republic of Germany between Austrian and West German
firms, was legally unobjectionable in the Federal Republic as being a pure export cartel; the
Austrian Supreme Court, however, held it to be void as being contrary to mandatory Austrian
cartel law (decision of 21.5.68, Osterr. Jur. Z. 1968, p. 601, No. 375). Whether a remaining
part of this agreement which was not contrary to Austrian cartel law (exchange of licences)
could be split off and kept in being was to be judged by German law, according to the
Austrian
Court.
28
The report on the debate in Kartelle und Monopole im modernen Recht, Vol. 2 (1961),
p. 98 1, alludes to this contribution to the debate in which Giinther concurred with the views
expressed by Schwartz, Anwendbarkeit nationalen Kartellrechts auf internationale Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, ibid. pp. 690-692.
2Kammergericht, 3rd November, 1932, 1PRep. 1933, No. 3; Seidl-Hohenveldern, Internationales Konfiskations-und Enteignungsrecht (1952), p. 160; Van Hecke, op. cit.
p. 322.
27
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conduct is not subject to penalty, or indeed under certain circumstances
may even be prescribed by the law in force there. Unlike the exchange
control matters just referred to, this question has not so far been regulated
by international treaty law. The Havana Charter was, it is true, intended to
eliminate these conflicts by providing a world-wide agreement on the mutual recognition of cartel regulations, but it has never come into force.3 0 In
its bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, the United
States has since World War II included the following clause, as for instance in Article XVIII (1) of the Treaty with the Federal Republic of
Germany: "The two Parties agree that business practices which restrain
competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control, and
which are engaged in or made effective by one or more private or public
commercial enterprises or by combination, agreement or other arrangement
among such enterprises, may have harmful effects upon commerce between
their respective territories. Accordingly, each Government agrees upon the
request of the other Government to consult with respect to any such
practices and to take such measures, not precluded by its legislation, as it
31
deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effect."
An American court has rightly declined to interpret a similar treaty
clause in Art. XVIII of the Treaty with Japan as meaning that it alone, to
the exclusion of other antitrust laws of the U.S.A., constituted the cartel
law applicable to a cartel arrangement between Japanese and American
firms regarding exportation to the American west coast.3 2 This was certainly not the intention of the contracting States. On the other hand, neither
do these provisions require the treaty partner of the United States to
tolerate claims to an extraterritorial validity of American antitrust law.
This is already evident from the text of the provisions, which in practice in
every case leave it to the discretion of the treaty partner whether or not to
33
support the anti-cartel measures taken by the United States.
When negotiating each of the many treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation concluded by it, the United States insisted on the inclusion of
this clause.3 4 It presumably wanted to be able later to contend that these
clauses constituted further evidence of the existence of a general consensus
among the nations on this point of law. It is, however, highly questionable
30

Nevertheless, the decartelization division of the Military Government for Bavaria
referred to the Havana Charter in a decision of 3.2.49, WuW Entscheidungssammlung All. 4,
Seidi-Hohenveldern,
AWD 1960, p. 228.
31
Treaty of 29th October, 1954, BGBI 1956 11 487, 273 U.N.T.S. 3 (1957).
32
United States v. R.P. Oldham Company et al., 152 F.Supp. 818 (N.D. Calif. 1957);
Whiteman, op. cit., pp. 148- 150.
33,.. may have harmful effects"; ... take such measures, not preculded by its legislation, 34as it deems appropriate."
List in Krumbein, op. cit., p. 64 note 1.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
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whether this object will be achieved. It is well-known that, even when
many treaties contain similar clauses, there are constant disputes as to
whether it is permissible to deduce the existence of a general consensus or
whether the very inclusion of such a clause does not tend to show that,
35
without that clause, the law affirmed therein would just not exist.
To refute the assumption that a general principle of law requiring mutual
tolerance of claims to penal jurisdiction for the infringement of national
cartel regulations already exists, 36 it is sufficient to point to the existence of
numerous states with a centrally directed economy, whose economy, therefore, as seen from abroad, is nothing but one gigantic cartel, and also to the
existence of other States which to a greater or lesser extent put the
principle of freedom of contract above the principle of freedom of competition, and in practice are not prepared to make any concessions in that
37
respect to the legal philosophy of the United States.
Now the Americans are fond of stressing the need for more intensive
international co-operation in combating cartels, and of pointing in particular to the growing threat to the freedom of competition represented by the
international cooperation of the multinational companies. Those who approve this idea should not, however, apply double standards. They should
take equally firm action to counter the impediments to competition emanating from the international trade union movement, which in July 1970, for
instance, induced the dockers at Antwerp not to unload ships which had
been redirected from London to Antwerp on account of the British dock
strike.
If it is desired to internationalize the penalty of offences against national
cartel laws, it would also be logical to recognize not only the cartel laws of
another state but also the penalties imposed under those laws, in the sense
that it should not be possible for a further penalty to be imposed under
domestic law for the same offence. Nevertheless, in the Quinine case the
Court of Justice of the European Communities took no account of the
penalties already imposed in the United States in respect of that cartel
arrangement, 38 while in the Wilhelm case 39 it allowed the penal provisions
of E.E.C. law, as well as those of the German Law against Restraint of
Competition, to be applied to one and the same cartel arrangement.
This practice runs counter to the principle ne bis in idem, which as a
35Seidl-Hohenveldern, V6lkerrecht, p. 98. In the Lotus Case, the PCIJ ruled in favour of
this second
alternative; PCIJ Series A No. 10, p. 27 (1927).
36
Schwartz, op. cit., p. 51, raises this question.
37
Hermanns, op. cit., p. 59.
38
Note to Annex D. of the Report by the Anti-Trust Committee of the I.L.A. for the
Hague
Conference.
39
Preliminary ruling of Feb. 13, 1969, Case 14/68.
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generally acknowledged principle of law is also valid in international law,
and is moreover entrenched in the Constitution of the German Federal
Republic. For the contrary attitude of the judges of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities there is a subjective, albeit not very convincing
excuse. The fact is that all these judges come from States in which, during
and after World War II, conflicts between the courts of the occupying
powers and the national courts were the order of the day. Such conflicts
were usually resolved by those courts ignoring each other. Thus it came
about that one and the same offense, say the purchase of a tire from the
stocks of the occupying power, was punished separately by each of those
courts. The occupation court punished the person who had bought the tire
from a pilfering soldier for being in possession of equipment belonging to
the occupying power, while the national court punished him additionally
for receiving stolen goods and black-market dealing. That was then the
prevailing practice of the courts, and one must concede that it was just as
unsatisfactory then as is today the practice of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities in the cartel cases referred to.
International co-operation in the field of cartel law is therefore, to say
the least, very imperfect and in particular does less than justice to the
claims of the United States to recognition of its Antitrust Laws.
Nevertheless, Section 40 of the 1965 Restatement seeks to resolve the
conflict described between the jurisdiction claimed for a cartel law, and the
attitude of the other state which denies that jurisdiction by implicitly
assuming that the cartel law represents a higher level of national interest. 40
Bar's proposal is in similar vein; he sees in cartel laws an interest of the
state enacting those laws which is worthy of respect and to which the other
states should in principle be bound to yield.4 1 In a debate with Schiller,
Erhard defended the proposition that the German Law against Restraint of
Competition, too, was law of a higher order; he was admittedly not comparing it with foreign law, but with the German Stability and Expansion
Law.4 2 It is only with some misgivings that I would put forward a further
objection to the U.S. thesis of the unlimited superiority of cartel law.
It concerns the case of the quinine cartel, before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (See footnote 16) and before American courts.
It is not intended to discuss here the moral aspects of the matter, which
concerns the increase in price of a medicament vital to the U.S. troops
fighting in Vietnam. To do so, one would have to be very knowledgeable
401965 Restatement, s. 39, p. 113.
41

Bar, op. cit., p. 329. Even more categorically, Lador-Lederer, International NonGovernmental Organizations and Economic Entities (1963), p. 298.
4Quoted in Sauter, Zehn Jahre Kartellgesetz, BB 1968, p. 1169. In terms of positive
Law, this claim is untenable.
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about the qualities and prices of synthetic quinine substitutes. The question
also arises whether the guilt of the American Government agencies, which
certainly chose the wrong moment to sell the U.S. Government's stocks of
quinine in view of the tense situation in South-East Asia even at that time,
is not greater than that of the cartel which acted as purchaser. Mr. Blair's
statement on the quinine case has been published in the Federal Republic. 43 It therefore seems to be permissible to voice opinion to it.
All that is of interest here in connection with the superiority of cartel law
is the complaint that one of the objects of the cartel was to manipulate the
purchase prices paid to an Indonesian State enterprise and thus obtain, at
the expense of that enterprise, excess profits from which an indemnity was
paid to the Dutch partner in that cartel by the other members for the loss
of the estates of which it had been deprived by the Indonesian State. 4a It is,
to say the least, illogical that it should be representatives of the U.S.
Government and of American business who, time and again at innumerable
congresses, criticize the seizure of foreign property without compensation
as being contrary to international law, and do little but complain that any
reaction on the part of the states and owners affected is mostly doomed to
failure because outsiders, acting from crude self-interest, breach the solidarity required to make economic sanctions effective, thus making such
sanctions appear pointless.4 But when for once, as in the case now at
issue, the competitors of an expropriated party do not exploit his difficult
position but show solidarity, this attitude is considered to be reprehensible,
or indeed criminal.
Within its own legal order, a state may of course value some laws more
highly than others. But in view of the fact that the values safeguarded by a
particular law are rated at very different levels by the various members of
the community of nations, such a state cannot expect other states to follow
its own higher valuation to the extent of subordinating their efforts to
protect their own sovereignty to the superiority which that state itself
attributes to the law in question. Any claim to the recognition by the third
States of the superiority of American or German cartel law could only be
based on a recognition of that superiority in the general customary law of
nations. Such a claim would be frustrated, not only by the differing attitudes of other states towards cartels, 46 but also by the fact that neither
4aBIair in H. Arndt, op. cit., pp. 123- 184. Cf. the author's review in Osterr. Zeitschrift

fir iffenliches Recht.
"Blair, loc. cit., p. 163- 164.
4Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, Whitlock & Co. and Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434,

note 38 (1964); simile, Oberlandesgericht Bremen 21.8.59, AVR 1961, p. 352; cf. SeidlHohenveldern, Vblkerrechtswidrige Akte fremder Staaten vor innerstaatlichen Gerichten, in:
Recht im Wandel (Heymanns Verlag, Festschrift 1965), p. 615.
4Vide supra, text at notes 36 and 39.
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American nor German cartel law prohibits export cartels, and therefore
does not consider cartels to be bad per se. The claim that those systems of
cartel law are superior therefore lacks credibility and is not likely to
eliminate conflicts between those laws and the legal order of third States.
In practice, the United States has often been at pains to avoid such
conflicts, at least in cases in which the conduct required by U.S. antitrust
law is illegal in the other country concerned. In such cases the party
affected is often exempted from the mandatory provisions of U.S. antitrust
law by means of a saving clause. 47 This self-restraint is praiseworthy. The
objection raised by Jennings 48 against this practice, namely that the renunciation of a claim which is contrary to international law does not mean that
its original assertion was any less contrary to international law, seems to be
exaggerated. Jennings' criticism is justified, however, when he points out
that this consideration for the legal philosophy of the other state often does
not go far enough. Such a state may, under certain circumstances, place
just as much value on upholding the rights of freedom guaranteed by it as
on the observance of the prohibitions it has enacted. Jennings takes the
view that this could apply to safeguarding not only, for example, the right
49
of free speech, but also the right to freedom of contract.
The de facto assertion of a claim to penal jurisdiction based on the
extended territoriality principle by the cartel law of a state is not only open
to the objections of an international law nature already set out above. The
agencies called upon to implement these regulations cannot, in the nature
of things, take any steps against a cartel arrangement until they are aware
of its existence. The imposition of a penalty for infringement of those
regulatiorqs must be preceded by proof of guilt. But precisely in the case of
international cartel arrangements, particularly when they are made solely
between aliens abroad, the relevant documents are likewise located abroad.
Especially in such cases, therefore, the prosecuting authorities often find it
impossible to furnish proof-although even in domestic cases the chances
of obtaining incontrovertible evidence of cartel arrangements are often
slender, too.
To overcome this difficulty in furnishing proof, various means have been
proposed which are likewise of doubtful validity in international law. In
practice, the investigations to establish the existence of an offense against
47

Seidl-Hohenveldern, AWD 1960, p. 231.
Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 British
Yearbook of International Law (1957), pp. 169, 174; contra, SeidI-Hohenveldern, AWD
1960, p. 231.
49
Jennings, The Limits of State Jurisdiction, 32 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret
(1962), p. 209. Hermanns, p. 33, concurs.
4

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2

292

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

cartel law often give rise to conflicts similar to those engendered by the
actual assertion of penal jurisdiction in such a case.
One way of avoiding the difficulty of furnishing proof in the case of
international cartels is shown by the Alcoa decision, inasmuch as it deduces the criminal intent to have an effect on the territory of the forum, this
being a requirement for the enforceability of the claim to jurisdiction, from
50
the fact that the cartel does have such an effect.
As far as German cartel law is concerned, Helmut Arndt is untiring in
his advocacy of the proposition that to obviate the difficulty of furnishing
proof when prosecuting cartels, the agencies responsible for combating
cartels should be supported in their activities by the formulation of ever
more comprehensive statutory presumptions of guilt. 5 1
This proposition raises a problem of international law: to what extent
would such statutory presumptions of guilt be compatible with Article 6(2)
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)? This provision reads: "Everyone
charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law." The question here at issue is whether the words
"until proved guilty according to law" admit of such statutory presumptions of guilt.
These words are also to be found in Article 14(2) of the U.N. Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights of 16th December, 1966,52 to which the
German Federal Republic is a signatory. They go back to Article 11(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 19th December, 1948, by
the General Assembly of the United Nations. 53 The documents embodying
the history of this provision 43 do not provide any informat;on as to whether
the words in question are to be understood solely as meaning that, in
establishing guilt, the court must observe the procedural rules of the State
of the forum even beyond the minimum laid down in Article 6(1) ECHR,
or whether they also allow statutory presumptions of guilt. Unless one
rejects this latter view, it would be possible to turn the sense and object of
this provision into their exact opposites, if, for instance, presumptions of
guilt were actually formulated along the lines of the joke that was going the
rounds in Germany during the state of emergency prevailing after World
War II, according to which there was a law which stated: "Anyone who
has not starved to death by 1st April, 1946, shall be punished for com50

Vide supra, text at note 6.
H. Arndt, op. cit., pp. 16, 43. An indication along the same lines is to be found in the
report of the Bundeskartellamt on its activities in 1969, Bundestag document VI/950, p. 15.
52
Khol, Der Menschenrechtskatalog der V61 kergemeinschaft (1968), p. 64.
53
Berber, V6lkerrecht-Dokumentensammlung (1967), p. 919.
54
United Nations, These Rights and Freedoms (1950), pp. 33-36.
51
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plicity in the black market." Biirgentha155 was right when, at the Vienna
Colloquium on Human Rights in 1965, he said: "There is probably a limit
beyond which the law of the adjudicating state cannot go, in that it cannot,
for instance, explicitly or implicitly assign to the accused the task of taking
evidence."
The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights have not so far made any pronouncement on this question.
In German law, the debate on the compatibility of statutory presumptions
of guilt with Article 6(2) ECHR was sparked by Section 245a 56 of the
Penal Code, under which the fact of a person previously convicted of
larceny being found in possession of housebreaking implements was
sufficient to warrant the presumption, rebuttable by the accused, that he
intended to use the implements, not for a harmless activity, but for housebreaking purposes.
If, despite judicial decisions to the contrary, 57 one accepts the view put
forward above that Article 6(2) ECHR does not allow statutory presumptions of guilt, a reliance on this principle vis- -vis agencies of the European
Communities could probably not be countered by the objection that Article
6(2) ECHR refers only to criminal proceedings. The applicability of this
provision cannot, after all, be decided by whether or not a state expressly
describes a particular procedure under its own legal order as a criminal
proceeding. In the case of an international convention, the only decisive
factor must be the substantive content of the regulation. But there can now
be no doubt that the cartel proceedings under the German Law against
Restraint of Competition are essentially of a penal nature. Here, too, the
distinction that Schlochauer 5 8 seeks to make between criminal proceedings
sensu stricto and administrative penal proceedings, lacks conviction. Such
a formalistic interpretation would, moreover, belie the objective of the
Convention, namely to achieve a broader and more certain protection of
human rights.
55

Comparison of the Jurisdiction of National Courts with that of the organs of the
Convention as regards the Rights of the Individual in Court Proceedings. Articles 5, 6 and 13,
in Robertson (editor), Human Rights in National and International Law (1967), p. 178.
Guradze, Die Europ~ische Menschenrechtskonvention, Kommentar (1968), p. 106, describes
the admissibility
of statutory presumptions of guilt as "controversial."
56
Repealed in 1956. Criminal Law Reform Law of 25.6.69, BFB I I p. 645; cf. Bundestag
document V/4094, p. 36, in conjunction with Bundestag document IV/650, p. 400, which
described sec. 245a of the Penal Code as being "of doubtful compatibility with the rule of
law" ("rechtsstaatlich bedenklich").
57
1n its decision of 3.10.58, NJW 1959 p. 1932, the Heidelberg Landgericht (District
Court) held sec. 245a of the Penal Code to be incompatible with the Human Rights Convention; contra, Schroder, NJW 1959 p. 1905; Brunswick Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) of 11.4.63, Neidersachsische Rechtspflege 1963, p. 189; and Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme58 Court of Appeal) 5.9.67, NJW 1967 p. 2367.
Vide supra, note 10.
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In the field of E.E.C. cartel law, it has not hitherto been the practice to
operate with statutory presumptions of guilt. If, however, the American
and German examples were to influence E.E.C. cartel law in this respect,
too, this would raise problems of international law in the E.E.C. which
would not in all respects be identical with those in the Federal Republic of
Germany. For the text of the E.E.C. Treaty nowhere refers to the European Convention on Human Rights. A direct application of the provisions of the Convention to acts of the European Communities via an
indirect liability of the Member States for the acts of the Community
created by them is admittedly out of the question, since one of the Member
States of the E.E.C., namely France, has not yet ratified the European
Convention on Human Rights 59 and since moreover the European Commission of Human Rights has expressly rejected such an indirect liability of
60
the Member States of an international body for the acts of that body.
This precludes only the application of the Convention as such, however.
The agencies created by the Convention would not, therefore, be called
upon to examine the compatibility of acts of agencies of the European
Communities with the Human Rights Convention. But this cannot and
must not mean that any examination of acts of the European Communities
for their compatibility with the principles embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights is precluded. For despite the fact that the
Convention has not been ratified by France, these principles constitute
general principles of law which are common to the legal orders of the
E.E.C. Member States and are therefore among the legal norms to be
applied by the Court of Justice of the Communities in implementation of
61
the E.E.C. Treaty.
Any invocation of statutory presumptions of guilt will therefore encounter objections based on the ideal of the rule of law embodied in the
European Convention on Human Rights and as such constituting international law.
Attempts to overcome the difficulty of furnishing proof by laying hands
more or less directly on evidence located abroad constitute a direct en59
Capotorti, Possibility of Conflict in National Legal Systems between the European
and other International Agreements, in Robertson (editor), op. cit. p. 92.
Convention
60
Decision of 15.7.65 on Petition No. 2095/63, Yearbook of the European Convention on
Human Rights 8 (1965) p. 273 (283), and of 10.6.58, Petition No. 235/56, ibid. Vol. 2
(1958/59) p. 257, on the Oberstes Riickerstattungsgericht (Supreme Restitution Tribunal) in
Berlin.
61
Cf. Winfried Escher, Die Geltung der Europiischen Menschenrechtskonvention gegeniuber den drei Europiiischen Gemeinschaften (diss. Saarbriicken 1964); and Court of
Justice of the European Communities 12.11.69, Case 29/69, request by the Stuttgart Administrative Court for a preliminary ruling in re Stauder v. City of Ulm, EuR 1970, 39, with note by
Ehlermann.
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croachment on the sovereignty of the state concerned, which is protected
by international law.
In investigating cartel arrangements, to an even greater extent than when
claiming penal jurisdiction in the narrower sense, the United States in
particular has in recent years disregarded the objections existing abroad to
such activities on the part of U.S. agencies. Here, too, it cannot plead the
alleged superiority of U.S. antitrust law. In a case before the International
Court of Justice, the Court did not attach a higher value to the securing of
proofs of guilt which would justify the infringement thereby entailed of the
62
sovereignty of the state concerned.
Third states rightly regard it as inadmissible for the United States to
have investigations in cartel cases carried out by American investigating
officers outside U.S. territory. It is justly pointed out that Switzerland held
similar prying activities by persons acting on behalf of the exchange-control agencies of the German Reich to be inadmissible. In
Kampfer v. the Public Prosecutor of Zu-rich,63 the Swiss Federal Court

rightly declined to recognize the allegedly voluntary consent of the firm
concerned as a ground justifying such an investigation. There can obviously be no question of voluntary consent when the consent of the firm
concerned is obtained by the threat of severe penalties, particularly when
this is done on the basis of statutory presumptions of guilt.6 4
Similar strictures apply to the practice of the U.S. antitrust authorities of
using a more-or-less firmly based jurisdiction over the subsidiary or a
marketing agency of a foreign enterprise6 5 to require the enterprise concerned to produce a large volume of business records in the hope that from
the material so requisitioned it will somehow be possible to prove the
existence of the cartel arrangement suspected by the U.S. antitrust authorities. Such requisitions of documentary material are very aptly known as
"fishing expeditions."
Quite apart from the objections engendered by the desire of the foreign
State to safeguard its own sovereignty, a further objection to the practice of
"fishing" is perhaps to be found among the generally recognized principles
62

Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania), 9th April, 1949, ICJ
Reports 1949, pp. 34-35.
63Bundesgericht (Swiss Federal Court) 6.3.39, BGE 65 1 39; cf. also the protests in the
Austrian press against the taking of the deposition on Austrian soil, of a German witness
whose testimony was of importance to the HS 30 Committee of the German Bundestag, by
two members of that Committee. (Tiroler Tugesseitung September 28, 1968. Rightly Heubel,
Bankgcheimmis fur Zweignierterlassungen amerikanischer Banken in Deutschlant gegenuber
den Beh6roten der USA (thesis Frankfurt 1970) p. 104 considers the snooping of American
Internal Revenue Service agents in alien countries a violation of international law.
6Rehbinder, op. cit., pp. 394-396; Seidl-Hohenveldern, JZ 1963, p. 39, and AWD 1963,
p. 75; contra, Schlochauer, op. cit., p. 68; undecided, Schwartz, op. cit., p. 249.
6Cases in Hermanns, op. cit., pp. 2-3, and Whiteman, op. cit., pp. 160-179.
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of procedural law. A recent decision by an international arbitration tribunal
is relevant here. In its Binding Opinion of 6th May, 1969, No. 78, in
Energieversorgung Schwaben A.G. v. the Republic of Austria, the Arbitration Tribunal set up under the Austro-German Property Treaty refused
an application by the plaintiff to produce evidence of an exploratory nature.
The decision was based on the following facts: The plaintiff, a German
company, held, at the end of the war, about one-third of the shares of the
Austrian Ill-Werke A.G. In virtue of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agreements the French Occupying Power in Austria, in whose Zone Ill-Werke
A.G. was domiciled, could have confiscated the shares as German property, but refrained from doing so. It was not until the end of the period of
occupatiQn that the Austrian Government issued such a confiscation order,
claiming that all German property had been transfered to Austria by the
occupying powers. The plaintiff then contended that the French Occupying
Power had not confiscated the shares because it was vital for the Swabian
territory forming part of the French Zone of Occupation in Germany to be
able to continue to obtain electricity from the Austrian Ill-Werke. The
French Occupying Power had therefore deliberately intended to leave the
shares in the hands of the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the Tribunal to
address inquiries to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany
and the French Republic; from the replies to these inquiries it would be
evident that the French Occupying Power had at the time indeed refrained
from confiscating the shares with this intention in mind. The Tribunal held
that the onus of proof for his contentions lay with the plaintiff, and went on
to say: "Despite a lack of evidence concerning the fact to be proved, a
decision to call for certain evidence ... should not be taken if the evidence
is put forward at random, or for exploratory purposes on the basis of mere
presumptions, unless the party calling the evidence has adduced sufficient
grounds for his contentions to constitute a prima facie case, so that the
hearing of the evidence is intended to provide the basis for new contentions." To call for inadmissible exploratory evidence of this kind was
generally prohibited in both Treaty States "as a bulwark against the criminalization of civil procedure." 66 "Facts not adduced in a definite manner
cannot form the object of proofs offered by the parties. It is out of the
question for the parties to a proceeding to ask for evidence to be heard and
to await the results produced by that evidence before being able to put
forward the relevant facts. Evidence may only be offered in substantiation
of definite contentions already formulated by the parties, and not to elucidate a situation giving rise to points of law, the constituent elements of
"Cartel proceedings, of course, come within the ambit of criminal law. Nevertheless,
these pronouncements by the Tribunal appear also to be relevant to such cases.
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which are not clear to the party itself and have not been put forward by it
'6 7
in definite or concrete form."
To counter these practices, eleven states have already taken legislative
measures intended to protect business records located within their jurisdiction against such requisitions. 8 On the whole, these enactments, which
threaten penalties for allowing such records to leave the country, have
achieved their purpose, since the United States as a rule refrains from
enforcing its antitrust legislation if the conduct required by the U.S. laws is
liable to be penalized in the foreign State concerned. It would probably not
be feasible to frustrate the effect of these enactments by the same means as
U.S. courts once applied against a Mexican law of earlier date, which
merely provided that business records of Mexican firms had to remain in
Mexico. A U.S. court circumvented this law by observing that the party
concerned could submit photocopies instead of the original documents. 69
It should, however, be mentioned that in the matter of the similar
problem of access to records which are of importance for tax purposes, the
German courts compel a branch operating on German territory of a foreign
firm to produce records kept at the firm's head office abroad. 70 When the
position was reversed, however, the Reichsfinanzhof (pre-1945 supreme
court for tax matters) held 7' that it was unreasonable to require a German
parent company to procure from abroad the books of the foreign companies controlled by it and submit them to the German Tax Office. A
similar reluctance is to be found in the decision by the Swiss Federal Court
in Vetania Trust Reg. v. Lloyds Bank (Foreign) Ltd.72 Here the Swiss
court found that it was not competent to require a bank which was allowed
to engage in the banking business in Switzerland to effect a sequestration,
ordered by a Swiss court, of shares which the bank in question did not
have in its custody in Switzerland, but had deposited with its correspondent bank in New York. In the opinion of the court, a sequestration
ordered in Switzerland could only extend to objects physically present in
Switzerland.
In their investigation of the international quinine cartel, the American
67Page 71 of the (as yet unpublished) Binding Opinion.
68
Krumbein, op. cit., pp. 54-56; Van Hecke, op. cit., pp. 298-299; Rehbinder, op. cit., p.
393; supra note 14, p. 58 Ellis mentions Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, India, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario
and Quebec.
6Securities and Exchange Commission v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th
Cir. 71945),
Whiteman, op. cit., p. 163.
0
Reichsfinanzhof 27.9.33, Amtl. Sammlung Vol. 34, p. 21 0 .
71
Reichsfinanzhof 25.5.38, Reichssteuerblatt 1938, p. 619, No. 532.
72
Bundesgericht (Swiss Federal Court) 11.5.64, BGE 90 11 158; the judgment does not
contain any detailed considerations of international law. It meets with the approval of Harald
Huber, SJZ 1969 p. 150, and is criticized by Kleiner, SJZ 1968 p. 211.
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antitrust authorities showed no such reticence. On the contrary, they
instructed the First National City Bank in New York to make business
documents of a customer of the bank's German branch accessible to the
antitrust authorities of the United States, thereby violating German bank
secrecy. The American courts dismissed the objection of the First National
City Bank, that by acting in this way it would expose itself at least to
claims for compensation from its German customer in the Federal Republic. A substantial contributory factor to this judgment, however,, was the
circumstance that German law does not afford the same protection to bank
secrecy as it does to, for instance, the professional secrecy of the doctor or
the lawyer, and that the competent German authorities did not raise any
objection to the fact that the bank was being compelled by the American
antitrust authorities, under threat of heavy penalties, to violate the laws of
the German Federal Republic by bringing about a breach of the contract of
bailment concluded between its German branch and the German customer. 73 Such an unreasonable demand by the American antitrust authorities
seems almost as incompatible with German sovereignty as the carrying-out
of investigations on the territory of the German Federal Republic by
74
American authorities on the basis of allegedly voluntary consent.
Here again, the American attitude is illogical. Clauses 3020) and (k) of
the United States Automotive Products Bill of 1965 authorized the President of the United States to pass on to the Canadian Government certain
information on the activities of the U.S. automobile industry to which he
had been given access on the assurance that this information would be
treated as confidential. A storm of protest arose from the interested parties.
They cited in particular the decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), which expressly laid stress on a right to secrecy of business
records, at least in the absence of express statutory authorizations to the
contrary, and characterized the obligation to produce such records as an
act of despotism. 75 The Act itself, as ultimately passed into law, does not
76
contain the criticized provisions.
Summarizing, it is surely self-evident that both the claim to penalize, by
73

United States v. First National City Bank and Loveland, 396 F.2d 897 (1968), AWD
1968, pp. 306-309; cf. Hermanns, op. cit., pp. 1-2. The Court suggested (on p. 902 of its
decision) that the Bank was not likely to suffer any serious disadvantages from this breach of
contract, and in particular none of a penal nature. Heubel, op. cit., p. 129, 133 points out that
the situation
would be different in Switzerland.
74

Heubel, op. cit. p. 128 considers this claim to be incompatible with German public
policy. The latter should also ensure due respect to rules of public international law.
75
United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, First Session on H.R.
696076"The Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965," April 27/28/29, 1965, pp. 177- 178.
United States Code, 89th Congress, First Session 1965, vol. 1,p. 1014.
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virtue of a highly extended interpretation of the territoriality principle, even
those acts performed by aliens abroad whose sole point of contact with the
state of the forum is that they do not fulfill certain expectations of conduct
entertained there, and the claim that foreign law should yield to the extraterritorial enforcement of such claims to penal jurisdiction and rights of
investigation in cartel matters by reason of an alleged superiority of provisions of cartel law, are fraught with so many illogical premises that, if only
for that reason, such claims should not nowadays be considered to be
covered in any way by general principles of law, and therefore as being in
accordance with international law.
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